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Saving FACE:
Clinic Access Under a New Commerce Clause
United States v. Wilson, 73 F.3d 675 (7th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 1996 WL
137910, 64 U.S.L.W. 3669 (U.S. Oct. 7, 1996) (No. 95-1523).
In May 1994, President Clinton signed into law the Freedom of Access to
Clinic Entrances Act (FACE),' which proscribes blockades and violence
directed at facilities providing reproductive health services. Congress
authorized FACE under the Commerce Clause2 and under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 3 Just months after the law went into effect, Michael
Skott, an anti-abortion protester arrested and convicted under FACE for
blockading the Wisconsin Women's Health Care Center,' challenged
Congress's authority to enact the law.5 He contended that the statute
unconstitutionally exceeded Congress's Commerce Clause power on the
grounds that reproductive health services do not constitute interstate
commerce. 6 Until recently, such a challenge would have had little hope of
success. For over fifty years, the Supreme Court extended great deference to
Congress by declining to "set aside [any act based on the Commerce Clause]
1. 18 U.S.C.A. § 248 (West Supp. 1996): see infra text accompanying notes 16-20
2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
3. U.S. CoNs-r. amend. XIV, § 5.
4. Skott, George Wilson, and others blockaded the Center by cramming automobiles into the cntranccs
and welding themselves into interlocking steel apparatuses welded to the cars "'One defendant %%as located
in the driver's seat, restrained by a welded steel device confining his head in a steel haress [Another
defendant's] head was restrained in a locked harness secured around his throat." United States ' Wilson.
73 F.3d 675, 677 (7th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 64 U.S.L.W. 3669 (U.S. Oct. 7. 1996) (No 95-1523) While
firefighters used blowtorches, saws, and pry bars to extricate the defendants, the blockade prcentcd 12
women from receiving scheduled health services. See id.
5. See id. Although Wilson was the named plaintiff below. Skott appealed to the Supreme Court
6. See Wilson, 73 F.3d 675, petition for cert. filed sub nom. Skott v. United States. 64 U S L W 3731
(U.S. Mar. 20, 1996) (No. 95-1523) (certifying question whether FACE, ",hich operates directly upon
intrastate, non-commercial activities such as physical obstruction of facilities providing rcproducti.c health
services, [is a] lawful exercise of Congress' authority under [the Commerce Clausel as interpreted and
applied in U.S. v. Lopez [115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995)]?").
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as without rational basis."7 In April 1995, however, the Court decided United
States v. Lopez,8 which recharacterized and narrowed the Commerce Clause's
scope by holding that Congress overstepped its bounds in enacting the Gun-
Free School Zones Act. 9 Skott's request that the Court use its new Commerce
Clause analysis to invalidate FACE was ultimately denied. Even if review had
been granted, however, it seems likely that Lopez would pose no threat to the
new clinic access law.'0
In the twenty-three years since Roe v. Wade" was decided, abortion
opponents have won increasing restrictions on reproductive rights," but have
failed to convince the Court to overturn Roe outright.' 3 In response,
opponents have launched a campaign of violence against reproductive health
clinics and providers that has included blockades, bombings, death threats,
arsons, chemical attacks, stalkings, assaults, and murders. 4 The attacks
7. United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1363 n.43 (5th Cir. 1993), aff'd, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
8. 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
9. See id. at 1626.
10. Prior to Lopez, the Fourth Circuit upheld FACE in American Life League, Inc. v. Reno, 47 F.3d
642, 645 (4th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 55 (1995), but has on appeal Hoffman v. Hunt, 923 F
Supp. 791 (W.D.N.C. 1996), in which the district court stated that Lopez "represents new law which must
inform the proper resolution of this case.... American Life League ... [is not] viable after Lopez." Id.
at 806 n.5. Lower courts have generally upheld the constitutionality of FACE. See United States v.
Dinwiddie, 885 F Supp. 1286, 1297-98 (W.D. Mo. 1995), aff'd, 76 F.3d 913 (8th Cir. 1996); United States
v. Hill, 893 F. Supp. 1034, 1036-37 (N.D. Fla. 1994); Riely v. Reno, 860 F. Supp. 693, 707-08 (D. Adz.
1994); Council for Life Coalition v. Reno, 856 F. Supp. 1422, 1431 (S.D. Cal. 1994). But see United States
v. Wilson, 880 F. Supp. 621, 624-33 (E.D. Wis. 1995). Since Lopez, six additional lower courts have
upheld the Act. See United States v. Sodema, 82 F.3d 1370, 1373-74 (7th Cir. 1996), petition for cert. filed
sub nom. Hatch v. United States, 65 U.S.L.W. 3086 (U.S. July 26, 1996) (No. 96-141); United States v.
Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d 913, 919 (8th Cir. 1996); Cheffer v. Reno, 55 F3d 1517, 1519-21 (11th Cir. 1995);
United States v. Scott, 919 F. Supp. 76, 77 (D. Conn. 1996); United States v. Lucero, 895 F. Supp. 1421,
1423-24 (D. Kan. 1995); United States v. White, 893 F. Supp. 1423, 1432-34 (C.D. Cal. 1995).
11. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
12. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (upholding restriction on minors' access
to abortion and 24 hour waiting period for adults seeking abortion); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991)
(upholding "gag rule" ban on federally funded clinics from engaging in abortion-related activities); Harris
v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (upholding ban on Medicaid funding for abortion).
13. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 846 ("[Ihe essential holding of Roe v. Wade should be retained and once
again reaffirmed.").
14. See S. REP. No. 103-117, at 3 (1993) (reporting 131 death threats, 2 kidnappings, 327 clinic
invasions); id. at 6 (reporting 71 acid and chemical attacks); NATIONAL ABORTION FED'N, INCIDENTS OF
VIOLENCE AND DISRUPTION AGAINST ABORTION PROVIDERS, 1996 (reporting over 9000 clinic disruptions
and 33,739 arrests at clinic blockades); NATIONAL ABORTION & REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS ACTION LEAOUE,
CLINIC VIOLENCE, INTIMIDATION AND TERRORISM 1 (1996) [hereinafter NARAL REP.] (reporting 1900 acts
of violence against abortion providers from 1977-1992); Abortion Doctor Shot by Woman During Protest
at Kansas Clinic, WASH. POST, Aug. 20, 1993, at A] 7 (reporting shooting of Dr. George Tiller by pro-life
protester outside Wichita clinic); Abortion Doctor is Slain Confronting Man Burglarizing His Car in
Alabama, WASH. POST, Aug. 23, 1993, at A4 (reporting murder of Dr. George Wayne Patterson during
walk to his car, but not confirming whether murder was abortion-related); Christopher B. Daly, Salvi is
Convicted of Murder in Abortion Clinic Shootings, WASH. POST, Mar. 19, 1996, at AI (reporting murder
of two clinic workers by John Salvi in Brookline, Massachusetts on December 30, 1994); Laurie Goodstein
& Pierre Thomas, Clinic Killings Follow Years of Antiabortion Violence, WASH. POST, Jan. 17, 1995, at
Al (reporting 37 bombings, 123 arsons, and 1500 cases of stalking, assault, sabotage, and burglary for
1983-1995); Mireya Navarro, Abortion Foe is Guilty of Murder in Deaths of 2 at a Florida Clinic, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 3, 1994, at Al (reporting murder of Dr. John Britton and bodyguard, James Barrett, by Paul
Hill outside Pensacola Ladies Center on July 29, 1994); Larry Rohter, Man Guilty of Murder in Death of
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explicitly seek to eliminate abortion: As one Operation Rescue field director
explained, "We may not get laws changed... [blut if there is no one willing
to conduct abortions, there are no abortions."'"
Thirteen days after a pro-life activist murdered Dr. David Gunn, Senator
Edward Kennedy introduced FACE. 6 Before FACE, existing federal, state,
and local laws failed both to protect patients and providers and to keep clinics
open.' 7 The Act's purpose is to prevent blockades, violence, and threats
against medical facilities and personnel who provide abortion services, and to
provide criminal penalties and civil remedies when such acts do occur."' To
that end, it prohibits force or the threat of force or physical obstruction to
intentionally injure, intimidate, or interfere with anyone obtaining or providing
reproductive health-related services.' 9 The Senate determined that authorizing
FACE under the Commerce Clause was "clearfly] constitutional."2'
In United States v. Wilson, 21 the defendants persuaded the district court
that protecting reproductive health services under the Commerce Clause
exceeded Congress's authority.22 The Seventh Circuit reversedY holding
that obstruction of reproductive health facilities substantially affected the
national reproductive health services market."4 Skott's appeal asserted that
reproductive health services do not have a sufficient nexus to interstate
commerce to be subject to congressional regulation under the higher level of
scrutiny established by Lopez. 5
Abortion Doctor, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1994, at AIS (reporting murder of Dr Da~id Gunn b) Michael
Griffin during protest outside Pensacola Women's Medical Services clinic on March 10. 1993)
15. Sandra G. Boodman. The Dearth of Abortion Doctors. WASH POsT. Apr 20. 1993. at Z7
16. See 139 CONG. REc. S3523 (daily ed. Mar. 23. 1993).
17. Federal courts had accepted clinics' invocation of civil nghts la, 42 U S C § 19853 (1995) to
challenge abortion-related violence, finding that blockades constituted conspiracies to interfere with patients'
rights to unobstructed interstate travel to obtain abortions. See. e g.. National Org for Women -. Operation
Rescue, 726 F. Supp. 1483, 1493 (E.D. Va. 1989). aff'd. 914 F.2d 582 (4th Cir. 1990). rrv'd sub nom- Bray
v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263. 278 (1993). In 1993. ho~e~cr. the Supreme Court
held that the law could not provide a federal cause of action against clinic blockaders See id
18. See S. REP. NO. 103-117, at 2 (1993).
19. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 248(a)(1) (West Supp. 1996).
20. S. RaP. No. 103-117, at 31 (1993). The report found that patients travel across state lines for
reproductive health services, that doctors travel interstate to provide such set',ice, that clinics purchase
medical supplies in other states, and that blockades and sabotage hae closed clinic,. resulting in
diminished provision of reproductive health services and less interstate moement of people and goods See
id.
21. 880 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Wis. 1995). rev'd. 73 F3d 675 (7th Cir 1995)
22. See id. at 624-33.
23. United States v. Wilson, 73 F.3d 675. 680 (7th Cir 1995)
24. See id at 688.
25. Lopez requires that an activity not simply "affect" but "substantially affect" interstate commerce.
to be subject to congressional regulation. United States v. Lope=. 115 S Ct 1624, 1630( 1995) The Gun.
Free School Zones Act failed this test because the Court found that it "neither regulates a commercial
activity nor contains a requirement that the possession [of a gun] be connected in any way to interstate
commerce." Id. at 1626. Before Lopez. courts had almost always deferred to Congress's exercise of the
commerce power, even when used to regulate ostensibly local activities. See. e.g. Hodel ' Virginia Surface
Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981) (upholding regulations on intrastate coal mining). Perez
v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971) (upholding regulation of intrastate extortionate credit transactions).
Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (upholding regulations on production and consumption of home-
The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 106: 525
Perhaps key to the Court's decision to deny the FACE challenge was the
fact that the reproductive health services market is connected to interstate
commerce in ways that the Gun-Free School Zones Act in Lopez was not.
First, provision and attainment of reproductive health services are inherently
interstate commercial activities. Substantial numbers of women travel across
state lines to obtain reproductive health services.26 Clinic obstructions
contribute substantially to the unique scarcity of reproductive health services:
Fewer than seventeen percent of counties contain facilities and physicians that
provide abortion services.27 Clinic blockades are nationally organized, and
often involve hundreds of protesters moving across state lines to specifically
targeted cities such as Wichita and Pensacola.28 In addition, clinics purchase
supplies in interstate channels 29 and employ physicians from out of state. The
number of physicians performing abortions decreased in nearly every state
between 1982 and 1992,3" and over five hundred hospitals and clinics stopped
providing abortions entirely since the early 1980s,31 largely because of clinic
violence. 32 Consequently, eighty-three percent of U.S. counties lack a single
abortion provider,33 causing many physicians who do perform abortions to
"ride circuit" to provide reproductive health services in several states. 4
grown wheat). Some judges postulated that Congress could justify almost any action under the Commerce
Clause. See, e.g., United States v. Ornelas, 841 F. Supp. 1087, 1092 (D. Colo. 1994), rev'd, 56 F.3d 78
(10th Cir. 1995) ("Indeed, very few activities exist regarding which Congress could not reasonably find an
interstate commerce nexus.... Perhaps unfortunately, Congress's legislative power under the Commerce
Clause has become a virtual blank check .... ); United States v. Morrow, 834 F. Supp. 364, 365 (N.D.
Ala. 1993) ("[H]as not everyone been conditioned to believe that there is nothing which moves or has ever
moved which does not support an invocation of the Commerce Clause .... ").
26, See, e.g., National Org. for Women v. Operation Rescue, 726 F. Supp. 1483, 1489 (E.D. Va. 1989)
(finding that nearly one-third of patients at one Virginia clinic were from D.C., Florida, Maryland, New
Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Texas, and West Virginia, and majority of patients at one Maryland clinic
were from out of state).
27. See NARAL REP., supra note 14, at 4.
28. See S. REP. No. 103-117, at 13 (1993) ('"[M]uch of the activity has been orchestrated by groups
functioning on a nationwide scale, including ... Operation Rescue .... ') (quoting testimony of Attorney
General Janet Reno); see also United States v. Cooley, 787 F. Supp. 977, 980 (D. Kan. 1992) (noting that
"hundreds and perhaps thousands of persons came to Wichita from across the nation to [blockade clinics]
by acts of trespass and obstruction"); Larry Rohter, Doctor is Slain During Protest Over Abortions, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 11, 1993, at A15 (describing "long history of anti-abortion violence" in Pensacola).
29. See S. REP. No. 103-117, at 31 (1993). The Supreme Court has sustained use of Commerce Clause
authority under the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1988), to prohibit extortion or robbery that affects
businesses purchasing supplies out of state or serving out-of-state customers, see Stirone v. United States,
361 U.S. 212, 213-15 (1960), or otherwise acting interstate, see United States v. Green, 350 U.S. 415, 420
(1956).
30. See NARAL REP., supra note 14, at 4.
31. See Amy Goldstein, U.S. Abortion Services Drop; Fewer Doctors Performing Procedure, Stuidy
Says, WASH. POST, Jan. 22, 1995, at Al.
32. See FEMINIST MAJORITY FOUND., CLINIC VIOLENCE SuRvEY REPORT 2, 7 (1995) (reporting that
clinics experiencing substantial violence most commonly lose staff, and majority of clinics losing staff in
1995 report direct link to Brookline murders). Further, fewer new doctors are learning to perform
abortions-while 93% of obstetrics and gynecology residency programs offered abortion training in 1975,
in 1992 one-third provided no training and only 12% require it. See Goldstein, supra note 31.
33. See Abortion: Where Are the Doctors?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1994, at A26.
34. See Goldstein, supra note 31 (reporting that shortage is most pronounced in "much of the South
and parts of the Midwest, where the few available doctors often are circuit-riders, spreading their services
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Ironically, anti-abortion activists' success in reducing the number of clinics that
provide abortion has driven women and physicians to travel across state lines,
strengthening the interstate nature of the reproductive health services market
and the resulting Commerce Clause justification for FACE."
A second justification for congressional regulation of clinic violence under
the Commerce Clause stems from the need for federal law enforcement to
contain the violence. Many blockades involve vast numbers of protesters who
travel from other states and overwhelm state and local law enforcement. 3' In
other cases, law enforcement officers are openly unwilling to restrict or to
prosecute blockaders-Sheriff James T. Hickey of Nueces County. Texas
testified that because of his personal anti-abortion beliefs, if confronted with
illegal anti-abortion activities in his jurisdiction. "I will not (enforce the
law]. 37 In contrast, the absence of need for federal authority to control
firearms trafficking in school zones was a critical factor in the Court's finding
that the Gun-Free School Zones Act trespassed on an inherently local
problem. 38 Moreover, law enforcement officers' refusal to protect health
clinics and providers from violence because of the services they provide may
constitute sex discrimination,39  thereby implicating the Fourteenth
Amendment principles on which FACE rests.-'
In enacting FACE, Congress made specific findings that the reproductive
health services market is national in scope and that clinic violence is organized
on a national scale, and used these findings to justify its Commerce Clause
authorization. In contrast, when considering the legislation declared
among several cities or states"). Dr. Gunn had performed abortions in Flonda. Georgia. and Alabama See
Larry Rohter, Doctor is Slain During Protest Over Abortions. N.Y Tim.s. Mar II. 1993. at AI
35. Regulation of other interstate services has been sustained as an appropnate use of the Commerce
Clause. See Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States. 379 U S 241 (1964) (allowing regulation of hotels
under Commerce Clause on grounds that travellers seeking hotel accommodations often travel interstate).
see also United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624. 1630 (1995) (citing Heart of Atlata Mottel with
approval).
36. In West Hartford, Connecticut. approximately 40 lay, enforcement officers encountered oer 200
blockaders. Town of W. Hartford v. Operation Rescue. 726 F Supp 371. 374 (D Conn 19891
37. S. REP. No. 103-117, at 19 (1993); see also Sandra G Boodman. Abortion Foes Strike at Doctors'
Home Lives, WASH. POST, Apr. 8, 1993, at Al ('[Often] local law enforcement is unwilling to do their
job to protect physicians and their families.') (quoting Rep. Nita Lowey) In Buffalo. Ne% York. Ma)or
James Griffin invited Operation Rescue to his city. stating that police would treat protesters "'with
compassion.... If they can close down one abortion mill, then I think they'll have done their job " David
Treadwell, Buffalo Bracing for Abortion Protests. L.A. TIMEs, Apr 21. 1992. at Al 5
38. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1632-34.
39. Denial of abortion access through clinic violence may deny a federal constitutional right to a
protected class. The Fourth Circuit had found that clinics providing abortion scr- ices and %% omen seeking
abortion constitute a "subset of a gender-based class" in the context of a 42 U S C § 1985t3 (1995) claim.
see National Org. for Women v. Operation Rescue, 726 F. Supp 1483. 1492 (ED Va 1989). aff d. 914
F.2d 582 (4th Cir. 1990). but was reversed, see Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic. 506 U S 263
(1993) (declaring that "opposition to abortion cannot possibly be considered such an iational surrogate
for opposition to (or paternalism towards) women").
40. The Wilson court did not reach the Fourteenth Amendment authorization See United States %
Wilson, 73 F.3d 675, 679 (7th Cir. 1995) ("Because we conclude that Congress had authority under the
Commerce Clause, we express no opinion regarding the district court's Fourteenth Amendment
discussion.").
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unconstitutional in Lopez, the Wilson court noted that Congress made no such
findings about the effects on interstate commerce of gun possession in local
school zones,4 and has made no such findings about other activities which
individuals occasionally cross state lines to perform, such as "golfing, bowling,
camping, or shopping. ' 42 While the Court acknowledged that Congress was
not required to provide formal findings of fact to justify its legislation, it
suggested that such findings would aid its understanding of congressional
judgment.43
Finally, the extent to which FACE was modeled on past civil rights
statutes, such as the Civil Rights Acts of 196444 and 1968,45 reflects its
validity. In considering the Civil Rights Act of 1968, the 90th Congress found
that there was "no question of the constitutional power of Congress to punish
private interference with voting in Federal elections, interstate travel or
interstate commerce" under the Commerce Clause,46 and further found that
"[i]n dealing with violent interference with the right to be free from racial
discrimination in interstate activities it is reasonable to conclude that effective
regulation requires reaching related local activities also. '47 Soon after the
enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, local business owners who wished
to evade the antidiscrimination law challenged its connection to interstate
commerce, but were unsuccessful because many of their customers were from
out of state.48
Skott v. United States would have presented a promising opportunity for
the Court to validate the constitutionality of FACE and affirm Congress's
power to enact laws protecting women from gender-based attacks that impair
their access to interstate services. 49 For now, however, FACE stands intact,
safeguarding reproductive health clinics,50 providers, and women who depend
on them.
-Amy H. Nemko
41. See id. at 683.
42. Id. at 681 (quoting United States v. Wilson, 880 F. Supp. 621, 631 (E.D. Wis. 1995)).
43. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631-32.
44. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 and 42 U.S.C.).
45. Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 25, 28, 42
U.S.C.).
46. S. REP. No. 90-721 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1837. 1842 (citations omitted).
47. Id.
48. See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 304-05 (1966) (denying challenge by restaurant
owners); Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 253 (1964) (denying challenge by hotel
owners).
49. Cf Doe v. Doe, 929 F. Supp. 608, 615 (D. Conn. 1996) (upholding Commerce Clause
authorization of Violence Against Women Act ("VAWA") on grounds that gender-motivated violence
restricts women's participation in national economy). But cf Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic, No.
CIV.A.95-1358-R, 1996 WL 431097, at *15 (W.D. Va. July 26, 1996) (holding that Congress exceeded
commerce power in enacting VAWA).
50. Since the enactment of FACE, abortion-related violence has "decreased sharply." and clinic access
has opened "significant[ly]." Robert Pear. Protests at Abortion Clinics Have Fallen. and New Law is
Credited, N.Y. TiMES, Sept. 24, 1996, at A18 (citing statistics from National Abortion Federation).
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Upholding "Don't Ask, Don't Tell"
Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 1996 WL 396112
(U.S. Oct. 21, 1996) (No. 96-1).
In 1993, President Clinton sparked a political firestorm by renewing his
campaign pledge to lift the military's ban on homosexual service members.
Over the following months, the President, the Congress, and the public
engaged in a sometimes fierce debate that included extensive congressional
hearings and deliberations.' Ultimately, President Clinton acceded to a
"compromise" policy known as "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" (DADT) written by
conservatives in Congress. The new policy ended the military's former
practice of inquiring into service applicants' sexual orientation without specific
cause, but declared that "[t]he presence in the armed forces of persons who
demonstrate a propensity or intent to engage in homosexual acts would create
an unacceptable risk to the high standards of morale, good order and discipline,
and unit cohesion that are the essence of military capability."3 This Case Note
argues that constitutional challenges to the DADT policy have little chance of
success under the current standard of review.
Last spring, in Thomnasson v. Perr., the Fourth Circuit became the first
federal court of appeals to rule on the constitutionality of the new policy.'
1. See, e.g., Policy Concerning Homosexuality in the Armed Forces. Hearings Before the Senate
Comm. on Armed Services, 103d Cong. (1993) (hereinafter SASC Hearingl. Polics Implcations oJ Lifting
the Ban on Homosexuals in the Military: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Armed Servicei. 103d
Cong. (1993) [hereinafter HASC Hearing]; Assessment of tie Plan to Lift te Ban on Hlomosetuals in the
Military: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Military Forces and Personnel of the House Comm on Armed
Services, 103d Cong. (1993) [hereinafter MFPS Hearing]; S. REP. No 103-112. at 270 (1993) (eyplainig
and justifying DADT policy); H.R. REP. No. 103-200. at 286 (1993) (same); 139 COG REc H7080-89
(daily ed. Sept. 28. 1993); 139 CONG. REc. S11.168-228 (daily ed. Sept. 9. 1993)
2. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994. 10 U S C. § 654 (1996,. 32 C FR
pt. 41, app. A (1995) (implementing regulation).
3. 10 U.S.C. § 654(a)(15). The statute requires a discharge if a member. (1) attempts to engage in
homosexual acts (unless the member demonstrates, inter alia, that such acts arc unlikely to recur). (2) states
that he is a homosexual or bisexual (unless the member demonstrates that he has no propcnsit) to engage
in homosexual acts); or (3) attempts to marry someone of the same sex. See id. § 654(b)
4. 80 F.3d 915 (4th Cir. 1996), aff'g Thomasson v. Perry. 895 F Supp. 820 (ED Va- 1995). petition
for cert. filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3033 (U.S. July I, 1996) (No. 96-1).
5. Shortly after Thomasson, the Second Circuit tentatively upheld the DADT polic) in Able v United
States, 88 F.3d 1280 (2d Cir. 1996). The Eighth Circuit also recently upheld the policy in a brief opinion
that heavily cites Thomasson. See Richenberg v. Perry. No. 95-4181. 1996 WL 560208 (8th Cir Oct 3.
1996); see also Watson v. Perry. 918 F Supp. 1403 (W.D. Wash. 1996); Selland v Perry. 905 F Supp
260 (D. Md. 1995); Philips v. Perry. 883 F. Supp. 539 (W.D. Wash. 1995). But see Holmes v Califomia
Army Nat'l Guard, 920 F. Supp. 1510, 1526-28. 1534-36 (N D. Cal 1996) (finding that DADT 'iolates
equal protection and free speech); Thome v. United States Dep't of Defense, 916 F Supp. 1358. 1358 (ED
Va. 1996) (finding that DADT violates free speech): Cammermeyer v. Aspin. 850 F Supp- 910. 926. 928
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Shortly after the Navy began implementing the DADT policy, Lieutenant
Thomasson declared that he was homosexual, prompting the Navy to convene
a Board of Inquiry.6 At the Inquiry, Thomasson provided evidence of his
impressive service record but refused to address the DADT policy's "rebuttable
presumption" that a member's "statement that he ... is a homosexual"
indicates that he "engages in or is likely to engage in homosexual acts."7 After
the Board voted for Thomasson's honorable discharge, Thomasson filed suit,
claiming that the DADT policy violated his Fifth Amendment right to equal
protection and his First Amendment right to free speech.
According to current equal protection precedent, military regulation of
homosexual conduct is subject merely to "rational basis" review.8 Under this
standard, the question is "simply whether the legislative classification is
rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest." 9 As the Thomasson
court pointed out, this means that the DADT statute deserves a "strong
presumption of validity";'0 the policy survives facial attack if "there is any
reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the
classification."" This inquiry does not require the government to provide a
court with "evidence or empirical data,"' 2 nor does it give a court license "to
judge the wisdom, fairness, or logic of legislative choices."'
3
(W.D. Wash. 1994) (finding that DADT violates equal protection and substantive due process but not free
speech).
6. See Thomasson, 895 F. Supp. at 823.
7. Id. at 822. Under the DADT policy, a member's statement that he is a homosexual establishes a
rebuttable presumption that he has a propensity to engage in prohibited homosexual conduct. Under the
former, status-based policy, such a member faced a "mandatory" discharge if he could not prove that he
was "not a homosexual." Compare 32 C.F.R. pt. 41, app. A (1995), with 46 Fed. Reg. 9571 (1981)
(originally codified at 32 C.F.R. pt. 41 (1981)).
8. Current precedent in every circuit that has examined an equal protection challenge to the DADT
policy or its predecessor holds that military regulation of homosexual conduct is subject to rational basis
review. See, e.g., Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 927-28 (refusing to recognize homosexuals as "suspect class");
Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677, 684 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (same); High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec.
Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 570-74 (9th Cir. 1990) (same); Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454,
463-66 (7th Cir. 1989) (same); Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068, 1076 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (same);
Rich v. Secretary of the Army, 735 F.2d 1220, 1229 (10th Cir. 1984) (same). The government need only
satisfy a minimal standard of "rationality" in order to disfavor homosexual activity because such
discrimination does not burden any "fundamental" constitutional right. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478
U.S. 186, 189 (1986) (allowing criminalization of homosexual conduct). In its recent decision striking down
Colorado's antihomosexual fights amendment, the Court continued to apply a "rational basis" standard. See
Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1627 (1996), although the Court's result may presage a shift to a higher
standard in the future.
9. Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 928 (emphasis omitted) (citing Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 318-19 (1993)).
10. Id.; see also Heller, 509 U.S. at 320 (explaining presumption of constitutionality); FCC v. Beach
Communications, 508 U.S. 307, 314-15 (1993) (same); Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487 U.S. 450,
462 (1988) (same).
II. Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 928 (quoting Heller, 509 U.S. at 320); see also Beach Communications,
508 U.S. at 313; Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 11 (1992) (finding any "plausible policy reason"
sufficient).
12. Beach Communications, 508 U.S. at 315, cited with approval in Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 928; see
also Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 111 (1979) (finding no need for "convincing statistics").
13. Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 928 (quoting Beach Communications, 508 U.S. at 313); see also Heller,
509 U.S. at 324.
(Vol. 106: 531
Case Note
In addition, the Supreme Court has insisted that the judiciary treat
congressional and executive decisions on military policy with special respect.
While the Constitution gives explicit control over military regulation to
Congress 4 and to the Commander-in-Chief, I5 "the lack of competence on
the part of the courts [concerning military affairs] is marked.' 6 As a result,
"judicial deference to such congressional exercise of authority is at its apogee
when legislative action under the congressional authority to raise and support
armies ... is challenged."' 17 Such deference has, for example, extended to
Congress's decision to register only males for a military draft," Congress's
regulation of military conduct under the Uniform Code of Military Justice,"
and the President's discretion regarding military commissions.'
As long as the federal courts continue to hold that military regulation of
homosexual conduct is subject to a highly deferential, rational basis review,
gay rights advocates have little chance of overturning the DADT policy,2'
because the policy's discrimination against homosexual conduct rests on a
broad foundation of congressional testimony, deliberation, and reasoning.
Although opponents of the DADT policy may think it unwise or offensive, the
policy is "rationally" predicated on congressional findings that "[sluccess in
combat requires military units that are characterized by high morale, good
order and discipline, and unit cohesion"" and that "[tihe presence in the
armed forces of persons who demonstrate a propensity or intent to engage in
homosexual acts would create an unacceptable risk to" necessary morale, order,
and cohesion.23 In reaching these conclusions, Congress relied on extensive
hearings that included testimony from the nation's highest military officers,
independent defense experts, gay rights advocates, and front-line military
personnel. 24 After receiving evidence on both sides of the issue, 2 moreover,
14. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
15. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
16. Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 65 (1981); see also Gilligan v Morgan. 413 U S I. 10 11973.
Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 93-94 (1953).
17. Rostker, 453 U.S. at 70.
18. See Rosiker, 453 U.S. 57.
19. See Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974).
20. See Orloff, 345 U.S. 83.
21. Note that every federal circuit that considered the military's pre-1993 homosexual policy found
that the armed services could constitutionally prohibit homosexual conduct. See supra note 8
22. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994. 10 U S C § 654 (aX61 (1996)
23. Id. § 654(a)(15).
24. See SASC Hearing, supra note I; HASC Hearing. supra note I- Al FPS Hearing. supra note I
25. See, e.g., HASC Hearing, supra note I. at 270-79, 290 (testimony of military sociologist opposing
ban on open homosexuality). A study commissioned by the Secretary of Defense also supponed lifting the
ban. See RAND CORP. NAT'L DEFENSE RESEARCH INST.. SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND U S MILITAR'
PERSONNEL POLICY: OPTIONS AND ASSESSMEN'T (1993). Although opponents of the DADT policy might
cite such evidence to argue that the policy is unwise, the fact that Congress chose one sidc of a policy
dispute does not demonstrate that the policy is unconstitutionally "irrational." especially because the
government need not provide more than a "rational speculation" or "'conceivable basis" to support its
reasoning. See FCC v. Beach Communications, 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993) (holding that no empircal data
is required for rational basis). Of course, if the applicable equal protection standard became more rigorous.
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both Houses produced detailed reports explaining their conclusions. 2 6 In sum,
Congress went well beyond the establishment of a "conceivable state of facts"
required for rational basis review.27 Whether or not the result of Congress's
long deliberative process was ultimately "correct," Congress was not
"irrational" to have believed testimony from military leaders and other defense
experts that homosexual activity was "incompatible" with military service.
In an attempt to move beyond the rational basis standard, Thomasson also
argued that the DADT policy violated his First Amendment right of free
speech.2" Because the only evidence introduced against Thomasson before the
Board of Inquiry was his statement that he was gay,29 Thomasson argued that
the government had impermissibly penalized the content of his speech.
Because the statute was not, in his view, "content-neutral," Thomasson
maintained that the policy could only survive judicial review if it was narrowly
tailored to serve a compelling state interest.
30
Thomasson's argument, however, confuses the "content-neutral" use of his
statements as evidence with the "content-regulating" punishment of his
personal beliefs. As the Fourth Circuit explained: "The statute does not target
speech declaring homosexuality; rather, it targets homosexual acts and the
propensity or intent to engage in homosexual acts, and permissibly uses the
speech as evidence. ' 3' The DADT policy does not treat "speech" itself as
impermissible conduct.32 Instead, it uses speech declaring homosexual
orientation as evidence that a service member has a "propensity" to engage in
prohibited homosexual conduct.
In much the same way, prosecutors and plaintiffs routinely introduce
defendants' confessions and other statements to establish material facts, such
as motive or intent, without violating defendants' First Amendment rights.33
The Supreme Court has consistently upheld such evidentiary use of speech,
because such evidentiary practices are aimed not at punishing particular
then such empirical evidence could become more significant. But see David M. Bessho, The Military Ban
on Homosexuals: Suspect, Constitutional, or Both?, 12 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 845 (1996).
26. See S. REP. No. 103-112, at 270 (1993); H.R. REP. No. 103-200, at 286 (1993).
27. Thus, the DADT policy "embodies the exhaustive effort of the democratically accountable
branches of American government and ... reflects month upon month of political negotiation and
deliberation. Such products of the democratic process are seldom completely tidy or universally satisfactory,
but it is precisely on that account that they deserve judicial respect." Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915, 923
(4th Cir. 1996).
28. See id. at 931. This has been a common tactic in DADT cases. See cases cited supra note 5; see
also Daniel S. Alter, Confronting the Queer and Present Danger: How to Use the First Amendment When
Dealing with Issues of Sexual Orientation and Military Service, HUM. RTs., Summer 1995, at 22 (1995)
(encouraging First Amendment claims against DADT policy).
29. See Thomasson v. Perry, 895 F Supp. 820, 823 (E.D. Va. 1995).
30. See Thomasson. 80 F.3d at 931.
31. Id. (quoting Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 489 (1993)).
32. Under the policy, statements of homosexual orientation do not themselves constitute prohibited
conduct, but rather serve as evidence of propensity for conduct. See supra note 7.
33. See, e.g., Mitchell, 508 U.S. at 489-90 (citing Haupt v. United States, 330 U.S. 631, 642 (1947)
(statements of sympathy with enemy can be used as evidence of motive in treason trial)).
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"content" but rather at proving the elements of legitimate causes of action.
Thus, as the Fourth Circuit observed, the Court has recognized the "content-
neutral" use of defendants' words to provide evidence of motive in Title VII
challenges to discriminatory acts. Similarly, the Court has approved the
"content-neutral" introduction of defendants' racial slurs to prove aggravating
circumstances in criminal sentencing. 3' By the same token, "[no First
Amendment concern would arise ... from the discharge of service members
for declaring that they would refuse to follow orders, or that they were
addicted to controlled substances. Such remarks provide evidence of activity
that the military validly may proscribe."' 6 Simply put, there is no
constitutional reason why the military cannot use a service member's speech
as relevant evidence to establish facts that might form the basis for that service
member's discharge. If the underlying discrimination against homosexual
conduct is constitutional, then so too is the use of evidence indicating that a
service member is likely to engage in such conduct."
Because the DADT policy is aimed at conduct,"8 the question becomes
whether it is "rational" for the government to establish a "rebuttable
presumption" that a statement of homosexual orientation indicates a likelihood
of homosexual activity. 39 It is hard to dispute the Fourth Circuit's common
sense conclusion that a service member's statement that he is homosexual "has
substantial evidentiary value regarding whether he has a propensity to engage
in homosexual acts-'the military may reasonably assume that when a member
states that he is a homosexual, that member means that he either engages or
is likely to engage in homosexual conduct.''  The DADT policy does not
presume that homosexuals are somehow more prone to sexual behavior than
heterosexuals. Rather, the policy makes the practical assumption that
homosexuals and heterosexuals alike will engage in sexual activity. The
34. See Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 931 (citing R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul. 505 U S 377. 389 t1992). Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251-52 (1989) (plurality opinion)). see also Hishon % King &
Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 78 (1984).
35. See Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 933 (citing Mitchell. 508 U S at 487). see also Barcla) Florida. 463
U.S. 939 (1983) (plurality opinion) (allowing speech as evidence of racial animus in death wntencing)
36. Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 931.
37. See id.; Able v. United States, 88 l.3d 1280. 1296-300 (2d Cir 1996) tacceptng use of statement,
showing propensity for homosexual conduct, but remanding for examination of constitutionality of
prohibiting such conduct).
38. As further evidence that the policy is aimed only at conduct, the Thotnasson dtitrict court found
that it allows members "to affiliate with a group that opposes the polic). to make statements criticizing the
policy, to attend demonstrations in favor of homosexual rights. to read homosexual neu ,papers, or (tol
engage in other such expressive activities." Thomasson v. Perty. 895 F Supp 820. 825 tE D Va 1995)
39. Congress may codify evidentiary presumptions if there is a "rational connection bet'%cn the fact
proved and the ultimate fact presumed" that is not "so unrewonable as to be a purely arbitrary mandate "
Usery v. Turner Elkhom Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1. 28 (1976) (quoting J.K.C.R- Co % Turmpsccd. 219 U S
35, 43 (1910)); see also Watson v. Perry, 918 F Supp. 1403. 1416 n 6 (1996) (citing User-. 428 U S at
28). Note that under the pre-1993 policy, a statement of homosexual orientation resulted in a "mandator)"
discharge, rather than an evidentiary presumption. See supra note 7. A claim that the presumption itself
discriminates against homosexuals would also be subject to rational basis reviews. See hupra note 8
40. Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 932 (quoting Steffan v. Perry. 41 F3d 677. 686 (DC Cir 1994))
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difference is that the military absolutely forbids homosexual conduct. As the
Senate has observed: "[I]t would be irrational ... to develop military
personnel policies on the basis that all gays and lesbians will remain
celibate .. .
Even if such use of statements as evidence was not "rational" and
"viewpoint-neutral," Thomasson's claim would still probably founder on the
"special First Amendment considerations [that] surround the military
environment. '42 Because "[s]peech that is protected in the civil population
may ... undermine the effectiveness of response to command,"43 the
Supreme Court has insisted that "review of military regulations challenged on
First Amendment grounds is far more deferential than constitutional review of
similar laws or regulations designed for civilian society." Thus, the Court
has upheld a ban on the wearing of yarmulkes,45 the discipline of doctors
who urge insubordination, 46 the prohibition of disruptive campaign literature
and speeches on military bases, and the prior restraint of petitions circulated
to base residents. 48 Given such a history of deference, 49 the Thomasson
Court was understandably hesitant to overturn a policy that "Congress
expressly found ... was justified on grounds relating to performance of the
military function, perhaps the most important of all governmental
responsibilities." 50
Ultimately, challenges like Thomasson's to the constitutionality of the
DADT policy have little chance of success under current precedent. As long
as the Bowers rational basis standard continues to legitimate criminalization of
homosexual conduct, gay rights advocates have little prospect of reversing the
months of careful political deliberation that produced the military's exclusion
policy. With the Supreme Court's history of deference to military judgments,
moreover, the DADT policy presents the worst possible vehicle for a challenge
to Bowers. Unless defeats such as Thomasson provide substantial symbolic or
political value for the gay rights movement, advocates should consider
foregoing further suits against the DADT policy until the Court holds
discrimination against homosexuals to a higher standard.
-Warren L Ratliff
41. S. REP. No. 103-112, at 284 (1993).
42. Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 933 (citing Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507 (1986); Brown v.
Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 354 (1980); Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 758 (1974)).
43. Brown, 444 U.S. at 354 (citations omitted).
44. Goldman, 475 U.S. at 507. The government may even restrict its civilian employees' speech in
some contexts to improve its effectiveness. See, e.g., Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661 (1994).
45. See Goldman, 475 U.S. at 507.
46. See Parker, 417 U.S. at 760.
47. See Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 838-40 (1976).
48. See Brown, 444 U.S. at 354-58.
49. For a discussion of the judicial "incompetence" in military affairs that underlies this deference,
see supra notes 14-21 and accompanying text.
50. Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915, 933 (4th Cir. 1996).
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